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From of Action to be brought against Obligor.-Cases are to be
met with in which it is said that the holder must pursue "all legal
remedies" to collect from the obligor: Benton v. Pletcher, 31 Vt.
418; Rives v. Brown, 81 Ky. 636; Welton v. Scott, 4 Conn.
533; Sheldonv. Ackley, 4 Day 460.
And in Kentucky it is said that "to enable the assignee to re-
cover against his assignor, upon the implied contract resulting from
the assignment, it is indispensable that the assignee should have
prosecuted, with reasonable diligence, all his remedies, legal and
equitable, against the debtor; and the evidence of the insolvency
of the debtor, which is furnished by an execution, and the return
of nulla bona, is, in general, indispensable :" Chambers v. Keane,
1 Met. 289. In another case it is said that the "remedy by law
must be pursued in all its ramifications, and to its full extent :"
Trimble v. Webb, 1 T. B. Mon. 101. With the exception of Ken-
tucky, this is not strictly true; for the bolder, as will be shown,
is not bound to resort to those extraordinary remedies that creditors
sometimes do to coerce payment. Thus,
(a) Attachment.-If the defendant has left the state after the
assignment, leaving ever so much property liable to attachment,
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the assignee need not commence proceedings in attachment; and
the same is true if the property has been conveyed with the design
of defrauding creditors: Dies v. Watson, 76 Ind. 359 ; Titus v.
Seward, 68 Id. 456; Holton v. McCormick, 45 Id. 411; Sims
v. Parks, 32 Id. 363; Hubler v. Taylor, 20 Id. 446; qucere
as to garnishment: Pierce v. Short, 14 Ill. 144; Barber v. Bell,
77 Id. 490.
In Kentucky, however, an attachment must be resorted to if the
holder knows of property attachable, or by the use of due diligence
would have discovered it, perhaps; otherwise not: Clay v. John-
son, 6 T. B. Mon. 644.
And in Connecticut, where an attachment is the usual process, it
must be resorted to ; but with this distinction : only personal pro-
perty need be attached and not real estate, for the reason that "it
is the contract of the endorsee, that, by due diligence, he shall be
able to obtain payment of the note according to its tenor; and, of
consequence, if payable in money, that he shall be satisfied in this
medium." Land is not money ; and, therefore, the holder is not
bound to take it : Walton v. Scott, 4 Conn. 527, 533 ; Forbes v.
_owe, 48 Id. 413; Holbrook v. Canp, 38 Id. 23 ; Allen v. Bun-
dle, 50 Id. 588; Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 Id. 175. Not only must
a writ of attachment be brought, but search made for property
whereon to levy the writ: Holbrook v. Camp, 38 Conn. 23. The
Connecticut rule prevails in Vermont: Poster v. Barney, 3 Vt. 60.
(b) Vendor's Lien.-So, if the instrument assigned is secured
by a vendor's lien, the holder is not compelled to resort to it to
secure the payment of his debt: Sayre v. HelEwen, 41 Ind. 109;
Cheek v. Morton, 2 Id. 321.
(c) Mortgage.-If a mortgage was taken to secure the obligation
guaranteed, a resort to this must first be had, before suing the
guarantor: Barman v. Carhart, 10 Mich. 339 ; Baxter v. Smack,
17 How. Pr. 183. And this is true of an assignment: Levi v.
-Evans, 7 B. Mon. 115. See Brainard v. Reynolds, 36 Vt. 614;
Chalmers v. Moore, 22 Ill. 359; Wilson v. Barclay, 22 Gratt.
534.
(d) Equitable Liens.-It is undoubtedly true that in most states,
equitable liens need not be resorted to, as in case of vendor's liens;
but such is not the case in Kentucky, where all equitable liens must
be exhausted: Graham v. Chatoque Bank, 5 B. Mon. 49; M'orri-
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son v. Glass, Id. 240; contra, Cheek v. Morton, 2 Ind. 321. See
Brainard v. Reynolds, 36 Vt. 614; Chambers v. Keene, 1 Met.
(Ky.) 289.
(e) Arrest of .Debtor.-In Connecticut, if the debtor has not suf-
ficient property to pay the debt in full, the assignee must arrest
him: Welton v. Scott, 4 Conn. 583 ; and in Virginia, even though
he have not sufficient property out of which the claims can be paid
in full, it was intimated that imprisonment may be necessary;
for a man would not go to prison if he have money: ifooe v. Wil-
son, 5 Call 76. But this is pushing the question of diligence to
the very verge, and requiring of the holder the performance of an
act that few arewilling to do, even though it be their own business,
and they have no other security. In Maryland, it was held that
the holder need not arrest an insolvent debtor, and keep him at his
own expense; but if he were solvent it was not decided whether it
would be necessary or not: Crawford v. Berry, 6 G. & J. 63. So
in Virginia it is said not necessary to hold to bail: Harrison v.
Baines, 5 Munf. 456 ; see Johnston v. Hackley, 6 Id. 448, where
it was held that if the holder does arrest the obligor, so long as he
is under arrest no action against the assignor can be commenced :
but in Kentucky it is (Smallwood v. Woods, 1 Bibb 546), and the
result of the arrest must be shown in the complaint : Owings v.
Grimes, 5 Litt. 382; Smith v. Bacon, 3 J. J. Marsh. 312. It
should here be observed that several of the cases relate to taking the
body of the defendant in execution, after judgment obtained; but
the principle involved applies to the rule stated in the text.
(f) Fraudulent Conveyance.-Nor is the holder bound to bring
an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate, to sub-
ject it to the satisfaction of his execution against the obligor;
neither need he seek this relief in the original action brought against
such obligor; for these are extraordinary measures, not required of
the assignee: Jles v. Watson, 76 Ind. 359. Such is not the rule,
however, in Kentucky: Taylor v. Picklin, 5 Munf. 25.
(g) Bill of Discovery.-In Kentucky, if the assignee knows of
property of the debtor that can only be reached by a bill of dis-
covery, he must resort to it; otherwise, not: iieJadden v. Fin-
nell, 3 B. Mon. 121. But this is probably the only state in which
a proceeding (or its kindred proceedings supplemental to execu-
tion) of this kind is required ; for such are extraordinary measures.
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(a) Proceedings against Bankrupts' and Decedents' Estates.-
In those states where resort must be had to the obligor if any part
of the claim can be made, it is necessary to resort to the assignee in
bankruptcy of the obligor, before suing the assignor or guarantor;
or else be prepared to show that the estate will not pay any dividend.
And if utter insolvency is averred, it may be answered that the
estate will pay a dividend: JHayne v. Fisher, 68 Ind. 158. If the
complaint shows that the obligor is a bankrupt, it must further aver
lack of assets, applicable to the payment in whole or in part of the
obligation assigned or guaranteed: iSomerby v. Brown, 78 Ind.
353. Where the issue was on the allegation of the insolvency of
the obligor, it was held not competent for the assignor to prove that
the estate of the maker in bankruptcy would pay a percentage of
his debts : Williams v. Nesbit, 65 Ind. 171. The assignor should
plead such fact specially. Although in Indiana, from which state
these citations have been taken, the courts are usually liberal in
this respect; yet they have here gone beyond all the other states in
strictness : for in no state, it is believed, is it necessary to proceed
against the obligor's estate in bankruptcy, unless the assignment in
bankruptcy preceded the assignment of the obligation endorsed or
guaranteed: Tucker v. Fogle, 7 Bush 290; National Bank of
Commerce v. Booth, 5 Biss. 129. This is put upon the ground that
to require the assignee to file the obligation assigned against the
estate, would be to require him to go into a foreign jurisdiction to
litigate the case: Booth v. Storrs, 54 Ill. 472. And if proceedings
in bankruptcy are pending at the time of the assignment, suit
against the maker is not necessary : Roberts v. Atwood, 8 B. Mon.
209.
(b) But if the maker has died either before or after the assign-
ment, the obligation must be filed by the assignee as -a claim
against his estate: Dole v. Watson, 2 Ind. 177 ; Bernitz v.
Stratford, 22 Id. 320; -Hardesty v. Kinworthy, 8 Blackf. 304;
Zeklind v. Newkirk, 12 Ind. 544 ; Hayne v. Fisher, 68 Id. 158;
Huston v. First National Bank of Gentreville, 85 Id. 21 ; Taylo
v. Bullen, 6 Cow. 624. It seems that in Kentucky, if the obligor
is dead and insolvent, no action is necessary: Clair v. Barr, 2
Marish. 256. And in Virginia, if the obligor die leaving no exe-
cutor, and no administrator is appointed, an action is not necessary
---somewhat similar to the law of Kentucky referred to in the note
below: Hooe v. Wilson, 5 Call 76; Bronaugh v. Scott, Id. 93.
ANT ASSIGNOR OR GUARA1TOR.
But in Indiana, if the administrator die or resign before the estate
is settled, the assignee must procure the appointment of an adminis-
trator de bonis non, or else sue the heirs, or be prepared to show
that the estate would have paid no dividends, and that an action
against the heirs would have been unavailing : Litterer v. Page, 22
Ind. 337 ; Dole v. Watson, 2 Id. 177; Black v. Wilson, 7 Blackf.
532. And where the assignor conveyed all his property to pay his
debts, and died, it was held that the assignee could file a bill in
equity against the trustee for a sale of the property, no one having
administered on the assignee's estate : but it was not said that he
was bound to do so: Taylor v. Ricklin, 5 Munf. 25. Due dili-
gence does not require the assignee of an insolvent mutual insur-
ance company to sue the maker of the premium notes : Hubler v.
Taylor, 20 Ind. 446.
Pursuing Bail and Collateral Security.-Even in Kentucky the
assignee is not bound to exhaust the collateral security given to
secure the payment of the note: Bonta v. Ourry, 3 Bush 678;
but if bail has been given, it must be exhausted (Hlume v. Long, 6
T. B. Mon. 116), by taking judgment against him: Battle v. Blake,
1 Dev. L. 381. In Virginia, the contrary, however, is held: C(aton
v. Lenox, 5 Rand. 31. And there is no doubt in those states where
the entry of bail or stay of judgment or execution has the effect
of a judgment rendered, the assignee must pursue the bail with
ordinary diligence, by suing out an execution against him. But if
the endorser is secured, in case he is compelled to pay, diligence
against the maker is not necessary, unless a failure to proceed should
result in an actual loss to the assignor: Prentiss v. Danielson, 5
Conn. 175.
Series of Notes Assigned.-Of course the maker cannot be sued
before the notes are due. Sometimes it happens that a series of
notes are assigned. Where such a series, falling due at different
dates, were secured by a mortgage, and the mortgage was foreclosed
on the first note falling due, it was held that the amount realized on
sale of the mortgaged premises under the decree of the sale, should
be first applied to the payment of the principal due, interest and
costs, and then to the residue secured by the mortgage and note
due ; and an attempt of the assignor to have a different application
made of the proceeds of sale, must fail. It was also held that the
assignee's failure to use due diligence in the prosecution of his judg-
ment against the maker, upon the notes then due, was no defence
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in the action against the assigns upon the notes which afterwards fall
due: Willson v. Binford, 81 Ind. 588; Binford v. Willson, 64 Id. 70.
Failure of Consideration-Xlegality.-It is part of the assignor's
warranty that the maker is liable upon the obligation assigned.
And in an action against the maker by the assignee, if the latter
fail, on the ground that the note had been obtained without consid-
eration, the endorser is not bound by the judgment declaring the
invalidity of the note, unless notice was given to him of the pen-
dency of the suit; and the endorser, if not served with notice, may
show in bar of the assignee's action against him, that there was a
good consideration for the note: Howell v. Wilson, 2 Blackf. 418;
Maupin v. Compton, 8 Bibb 214; Marshall v. Pyeatt, 18 Ind.
255. But see Tam v. Shaw, 10 Id. 469, as to notice.
And where the consideration of the note has failed, or it was exe-
cuted without any, the endorsee may, as soon as he discovers the
imposition, sue the endorser for having assigned him a note which
the maker is not liable to pay, without waiting for the maturity of
the note, or bringing an action against the maker: Howell v. Wil-
son, .2 Blackf. 418; Caton v. Lenox, 5 Rand. 81; M rshall v.
TPyeatt, 18 Ind. 255; Fosdick v. Starbuck, 4 Blackf. 417 ; Stuts-
man v. Thomas, 39 Ind. 384; Kirkham v. Boston, 67 Ill. 599;
Tara v. Shaw, 10 Ind. 469.
So, if the note in any way is illegal, so that the maker may avail
himself successfully of the illegality, the assignee need not sue him:
Curtis v. Gorman, 19 Ill. 141. So, if the note is void as executed
by a married woman: Houston v. First National Bank, 85 Ind.
21; Mathers v. Shank, 94 Id. 501: Hughes v. Brown, 8 Bush
660. But it is not the rule in Kentucky that the assignee, in such
instances, need not sue the maker before resorting to the assignor.
Thus where the maker plead a non est factum, it was held that the
assignee may not dismiss his action before trial, but must proceed to
judgment: Wynn v. Poynter, 3 Bush 54. And if there be no
consideration for the note, he must also sue and proceed to judg-
ment; for the maker may not urge his defence. But in Indiana,
the assignee need not sue the maker to recover a part of a note that
is usurious: Johnson v. Blake, 3 Ind. 542.
Set off-Note Paid.-Where the assignor receipted a judgment
after he had assigned it, the assignee was allowed to recover back
the amount he had paid for the judgment: Hurd v. Slaten, 48 Ill.
848. And if the assignee is enjoined because of an equitable set-
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off he has against the assignee, he may recover ot the assignor on
making such a showing: Me Clung v. Arbuckle, 6 Munf. 315. But
in Kentucky it is no excuse for not suing the maker, that he held a
set-off against the maker more than the amount of the note as-
signed: Hunt v. Armstrong, 5 B. Mon. 399. Even though a note
assigned was paid at the time of assignment, an assignment with-
out recourse will not relieve the assignor from liability : Hays v.
Callison, 6 Leigh 230. But see Glass v. Bead, 2 Dana 168. See
Snow v. Baker, 3 Gilm. 258, where a judgment was assigned and
reversed, and recovery allowed of the consideration paid. See also
Roberts v. Jordans, 3 Munf. 488, for judgment.
No Authority to Assign.-If the assignor had no authority to
assign, and there is no express stipulation that he shall not be lia-
ble on his assignment, there is a right of action in favor of the as-
signee against the assignor, as soon as the assignment is made,
without resorting to the obligor: Fmmerson v. Claywell, 14 B.
Mon. 18.
Promise of Guarantor or Assignor after Taturity of Obliqa-
tion- -If a guarantor gives a note after the maturity of the obliga-
tion, guaranteed to secure the contract of his guaranty, the burden
of showing that the payee could have made the money off the
maker, is thrown upon the guarantor: Teller v. Bernheimer, 3
Phila. 299. So a promise of the guarantor, after the obligation
guaranteed is due, to pay, excuses laches in the holder: Tinkum
v. Dunean, 1 Grant Oas. 228 ; Barclay v. Weaver, 19 Penn. St. 396.
But an assignment after due, does not waive the requirement
of due diligence in collecting it: Broun v. Hull, 33 Gratt. 23. It
may be added in this note that contingencies which are remote, do
not enter into the contract of guaranty, unless specially stated:
ffeDoal v. Yeomans, 8 Watts 361.
Special Promise to Pay.-An assignor may, in his endorsement,
bind himself primarily to pay the obligation assigned; and in such
an instance it is not necessary to first proceed against the maker.
Thus, -where the assignment was in blank, but the assignor executed
a mortgage at the same time to the assignee, to secure his con-
tract of assignment, conditioned that if the assignor "shall pay said
notes according to their tenor and effect, or cause the same to be
paid," the mortgage should be void, it was held that the holder
could sue both the maker and assignor in one action, obtain a per-
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sonal judgment against both defendants for the amount due on the
assigned obligation, foreclose his mortgage against the assignor, and
have execution over against the maker for any part of the judg-
ment remaining unsatisfied by the sale of the mortgaged premises,
without first proceeding against the maker alone: JBoIertson v.
Cauble, 57 Ind. 420; see Josselyn v. Edwards, Id. 212; Zekind
v. Newkirk, 12 Id. 544; Burnham v. Galentine, 11 Id. 295;
Watson v. Beabout, 18 Id. 281.
Protest and Demand.-The mere fact that a note is protested
for non-payment, is no excuse for not suing the maker: -Ranson v.
Sherwood, 26 Conn. 437 ; for the note need not be protested because
of non-payment, nor any demand made upon the assignor for its
payment before suit brought against him: Hawkinson v. Olson, 48
Ill. 277 ; Couch v. First Nat. Bank, 64 Inl. 92; Burnham v.
Gallentine, I I Id. 295 ; Woolley v. Van T'olkenburgh, 16 Kan.
20 ; Offutt v. 7all, 1 Cr. 0. 0. 572 ; Ish v. Hills, Id. 567 ; even
though payable at a certain place: Barber v. Bell, 77 Ill. 490.
Issuing Process to collect Amount of Judgment.-With the
same diligence the assignee or holder must prosecute the maker to
judgment; he must pursue him with an execution, or other pro-
cess, for the collection of the amount due on the judgment. He
must use due diligence in taking out an execution and placing it in
the officer's hands: Saunders v. O'Briant, 2 Scam. 370; Nixon v.
Weyhrich, 20 Ill. 600; McKinney v. McConnell, 1 Bibb 239;
Rives v. Kumler, 27 Ill. 290; Harr v. Smith, 7 B. Mon. 189 ;
Baplee v. Morgan, 2 Scam. 561 ; Minnis v. Pollard, 1 Call 226 ;
Towns v. Parrar, 2 Hawks 163; Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221;
.Hume v. Long, 6 T. B. Mon. 116; Summers v. Barrett, 65 Iowa
292; Peck v. Frink, 10 Id. 193; Bishop v. Yeazle, 6 .Blackf.
127 ; James v. Nicholson, 6 Id. 288 ; Spears v. Clark, 3 Ind. 296.
Where execution was issued fourteen days after the close of the
term, it not being possible to issue it during term, this was held to
show due diligence in the absence of proof of any loss by the delay:
Spears v. Clark, 3 Ind. 296 ; s. c. 7 Blackf. 283 ; but it was shown
that the makers were insolvent on the date of the rendition of the
judgment. So a delay of twenty-four days was held not to be
fatal: Dorsey v. Hadlock, 7 Blackf. 113; Hanna v. Pegg, 1 Id.
181; Clark v. Spears, 8 Id. 302; Nance v. Dunlavy, 7 Id 172;
Killer v. Deaver, 30 Ind. 371.
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But a delay of thirty days was held fatal: Merriman v. Maple,
2 Blackf. 350; Willson v. Binford, 54 Ind. 569; Trimble v.
Webb, 1 T. B. Mon. 100; of two months: Bives v. Kumler, 27 Ill.
290. So a delay of five months: Gwin v. 1.Aoore, 79 Ind. 103;
Parker v. Owings, 3 Marsh. 59; of six months: Bishop v. Yea-
zle, 6 Blackf. 127; Trimble v. Webb, 1 T. B. Mon. 101; of seven
months: James v. Nicholson, 6 Blackf. 288; Treadway v. Dry-
bread, 4 Id. 20; Markel v. Bvans, 47 Ind. 326; Dole v. Watson,
2 Id. 177. And in Kentucky a delay of six days was held fatal:
Bard v. JeElroy, 6 B. Mon. 416. So a delay of seventeen days
was held inexcusable: Marr v. Smith, 7 B. Mon. 189. Where the
action was brought in the wrong county, a judgment obtained and
execution issued forthwith, and after four months another execution
was issued to another county, upon which there was a return of
nulla bona, it was held that there was a fatal negligence in the
prosecution of the action: Burk v. Morrison, 8 B. Mon. 131. And
it is required of the plaintiff to issue an execution to the county in
which the judgment was rendered: Saunders v. O'Briant, 2 Scam,
370, but he is not bound to issue it to another county : Bestor v.
Walker, 4 Gilm. 3; Judson v. Gookwin, 37 Ill. 286; unless he
knows of property there liable to the execution : Gilbert v. fenck,
6 Casey 205; Hoffman v. Bechtel, 52 Penn. St. 190. If the
assignor does not know of any property liable to the execution,
still the holder must use diligence in making the collection: Clayes
v. White, 83 Ill. 540. If the debtor has property in several coun-
ties, an execution must be issued to each county, if necessary, to
satisfy the debt; but the assignee is not bound to issue to any
other county than that of the debtor's residence, upon a mere sup-
position that he may have property elsewhere: Bard v. JrecElrofy,
6 B. Mon. 416; Goodall v. Stuart, 2 H. & M. 105.
Diligence in satisfying E-xecution.-In Connecticut, the assignee
need not give any directions to the officer holding the writ; the
command of the writ itself is sufficient : Welton v. Scott, 4 Conn.
533 ; nor is the officer bound to levy on or attach land, as has else-
where been stated: Mlix v. Page, 14 Conn. 329. In Pennsylvania,
he need not show property to the officer, " unless he has some spe-
cial knowledge relating to it :" Kirkpatrick v. White, 5 Casey
176 ; Hoffman v. Bechtel, 52 Penn. St. 190. The execution must
remain out until dead : Chalmers v. Moore, 22 Ill. 359 ; but where
it is permissible, an excuse may be set up, that keeping it out any
VOL. XXX.-27
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longer would be useless. There is, however, no presumption, after
the giving of the excuse, that, if allowed to remain out it would have
been satisfied ; but it may be shown that there was property after
its return and before it would have expired: Hamlin v. Reynolds,
22 Ill. 207. Mortgaged property must be exhausted: Bestor v.
Walker, 4 Gilm. 3; halmers v. Moore, 22 Ill. 359 ; unless it is
mortgaged to its full value: Pierce v. Short, 14 Ill. 144; and then
it must be shown beside this that the mortgage secured a valid
debt: Clayes v. White, 83 Ill. 540; Roberts v. Haskell, 20 Id.
59. If the property levied upon is replevied, the assignee must prose-
cute it to a finality, or show that it was not liable on the execution:
Levis v. Evans, 7 B. Mon. 115.
It is not necessary after return of nulla bona to issue a eapias
ad satisfaciendum, as has been elsewhere stated: Cowles v. Litch-
field, 2 Scam. 356. (The reader is referred to the section on
kind of action to be brought, for other citations.) Where an execu-
tion was quashed, because of the bankruptcy of the maker, it was
held not necessary to issue a second one: Tucker v. Bogle, 7 Bush
290. Diligence in bringing the property to sale must be used.
Thus where a levy was made, and a return of the execution made
for want of buyers, and five months afterwards an alias execution
was issued, instead of a venditioni exponas, and no sale was effected,
this lack of diligence was held fatal: Macy v. Hollingsworth, 7
Blackf. 849. See Barksdale v. Penwick, 2 Hen. & Munf. 113 n.
When delaying the issuing of Execution does not injure, or is
exeused.-In those forums where insolvency may be shown as an
excuse for not suing, the execution need not issue, if it would be
"wholly unavailing, precisely as for the same reason he would be
excused from commencing suit :" Bestor v. Walker, 4 Gilm. 12,
and any delay that works the assignor no injury is not fatal: Gay
v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221; G-win v. Moore, 79 Ind. 103. So, if the
execution is delayed by consent of the assignor, he cannot complain:
Crawford v. Berry, 6 G. & J. 63; -ance v. Dunlavy, 7 B. Mon.
172; Davis v. Leitzman, 70 Ind. 275; Huston v. First Nat.
Bank, 85 Id. 21; Sims v. Parks, 32 Id. 363; Schmied v.
Frank, 86 Id. 250 ; Psay v. Morrison, 10 Gratt. 149. D. assigned
a note to H., and agreed therein not to take any advantage by rea-
son of indulgence to the maker. H. assigned it to M., who delayed
its collection unnecessarily. D. was held not only liable to H., but
to MI.; McLaughlin v. Duffield, 5 Gratt. 133.
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The Return of Nulla Bona.-A nulla bona may be entered
after suit commenced against assignor, and used as evidence,
"whenever made, it showed, primafaeie, due diligence :" Woods v.
Sherman, 71 Penn. St. 101. Such a return is only prima facie
evidence of insolvency and not conclusive upon the assignor: H oe
v. Wilson, 5 Call 76 ; Levis v. Evans, 7 B. Mon. 115 ; Dana v.
Conant, 30 Vt. 246; R7anna v. Pegg, 1 Blackf. 181; Owivgs v.
Grimes, 5 Litt. 332.
In all such instances, when sued, the assignor or guarantor may
show that the maker had property liable to the execution; but he
must show that ordinary search would have found it, or, at least,
that the execution plaintiff knew of it: Lumen v. Neete, 3 B. Mon.
165. In Kentucky, on a return of non est inventus, if demandable,
he must demand bail, and if he does not, he is guilty of negligence:
Sprott v. McKinney, 1 Bibb. 595. In Virginia, however, the return
of nulla bona is conclusive hpon the assignor: Smith v. Triplett, 4
Leigh 590; Goodall v. Stewart, 2 H. & M. 105. In Kentucky,
said to be conclusive, if returned from county where debtor resided;
if returned from county where he did not reside, not even prima
facie: Thompson v. CaldwelZ, 2 Bibb 290.
False Return of _Nulla Bona.-If the sheriff make a false return
of nulla bona, in those states where he is bound by it, the assignor
may sue him the same as if he were the execution plaintiff: Smith
v. Triplett, 4 Leigh 590.
Waste by Offeer.-The question was raised, that if the officer
waste the maker's property, could the assignee go back on the as-
signor, or must he pursue the sheriff: Barnitz v. Stratford, 22
Ind. 320. This would probably be requiring of the assignee ex-
traordinary diligence. But in Kentucky, if the officer so conduct
himself that the action proves a failure, he must first be sued. Such
would be the case where he liberated the maker from arrest on the pro-
cess: Johnson v. Lewi s, 1 Dana 182; Wright v. Strange, 5 B. Mon.
250; or a bond he had taken was quashed for an irregularity: Young
v. Cosby, 3 Bibb 227. See Trimble v. Webb, 1 T. B. Mon. 100.
Discharge under Insolvent Laws.-Showing a discharge under
the insolvent laws is a prima facie showing of the assignor's lia-
bility ; and equivalent to a return of nu/la bona: Bu/litt v. Serib-
ner, 1 Blackf. 14 ; Banc of U. S. v. Weisiger, 2 Pet. 331. And
where the debtor takes the customary oath, and files a schedule of
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property, in a suit against the assignor, the assignee must produce
the schedule and show the amount of property, and that he is not
bound to pursue it: Oldham v. Bengan, 2 Litt. 132. A discharge
in another action is no excuse for not proceeding against the maker:
Parker v. Owings, 3 Marsh. 59. See, generally, Brown v. Boss,
6 Munf. 391 ; Lee v. Love, 1 Call 497 ; Saunders v. Marshall, 4
H. & M. 455.
The Record of the Proceedings as -Evidence against the Assignor.
-Showing a return of nulla bona, and all the other attendant cir-
cumstances to show diligent prosecution, makes out a prima facie
case, in favor of the assignee, in a suit against the assignor : Bul-
litt v. Scribner, 1 Blackf. 14. This was held true, even in a case
of a justice of the peace's proceedings : Raplee v. Morgan, 2 Scam.
561 ; but this not always true, as has been elsewhere shown: Bores-
man v. Marsh, 6 Blackf. 285. But the record of the proceedings
against the maker may be given in evidence against the assignor or
guarantor, to show diligence: Harmon v. Thornton, 2 Scam. 351 ;
Raplee v. Morgan, Id. 561; Williams v. Nesbit, 65 Ind. 171 ;
Mackie v. Davis, 2 Wash. 219.
If it is alleged that the action of the assignee was defeated
because the maker plead a want of consideration, the record is not
admissible: Howell v. Wilson, 2 Blackf. 418. The judgment in
the proceedings against the maker, cannot be attacked collaterally
by the assignor: Williams v. Nesbit, 65 Ind. 171.
Equal to a Protest.-In a Virginia case, it was said that the
return of a nulla bona was equal to a protest upon a bill of exchange
or promissory note, as evidence of non-payment or non-acceptance:
Goodall v. Stuart, 2 H. & M. 105.
Failure of Property to sell for full Value.-If the .property
levied upon does not bring its full value on execution sale, the
assignor cannot complain, even though it sell for only a nominal
sum; for, as between him and the assignee, the price it brought at
such sale must be taken for its full value: Markel v. Evans, 47
Ind. 826. And this was held true, although the assignee purchased
in the property, and the attempt was made to hold him as trustee
for the assignor: see Schmied v. Frank, 86 Ind. 250.
Recovery of Costs by Assignee.-If the action against the maker
has proven futile, the assignee may recover whatever costs he has
laid out and expended: but perhaps not his attorney's fees - unt
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v. Chambers, 12 Bush 155; Butler v. Suddeth, 6 Mon. 542;
.Ewing v. Sills, 1 Ind. 125 ; so may a guarantor: Woodstock Bank
v. Downer, 27 Vt. 539 ; but not for protest fees, for they are un-
necessary : Woolley v. Van Volkenburgh, 16 Kan. 20.
What kind of Insolvency excuses Suit against Maker.-It has
been already stated that the insolvency of the maker, in many
forums, will excuse the holder or assignee from suing him before re-
sorting to the assignor or guarantor. The insolvency, however, that
will excuse the bringing of an action against the maker, is not a gen-
eral insolvency, an inability to pay his debts in the ordinary course
of his daily transactions : .errick v. Borst, 4 Hill 652; Buchannan
v. Smith, 166Wall. 308; In re Bininger, 7 Blatchf. 264; Rogers
v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 69; Lee v. Kilburn, 3 Gray 600. To excuse
the holder from suing the maker, requires an utter insolvency in
him. In an early case it was said that, "1 when any probability ex-
ists that payment can be enforced by means of a suit, it ought to
be brought; but when it is certain that nothing can be obtained, it
would be injustice to the assignor to commence an action :" Bron-
augh v. Scott, 5 Call 93. This principle is engrafted in some
of the statutes, where they provide that if the action against
the maker would have been " wholly unavailing," it need not
be brought: Bestor v. Walker, 4 Gilm. 15. " The term ' open
and notorious insolvency,' therefore, when used in connection with
this question, imports something more than when used in com-
mon parlance. It implies, not the want of sufficient property to
pay all of one's debts; but the absence of all property within the
reach of the law, applicable to the payment of any debt :" Ezardesty
v. Kinworthy, 8 Blackf. 304. " He is not required to sue the
maker, unless the latter has property out of which he can enforce
the payment of some part of his claim :" Williams v. Osbon, 75
Ind. 285.
This is the language of many of the cases, in a few of which the
exact point is decided ; but in many it is stated only as a dictum :
,Somerby v. Brown,'73 Ind. 353 ; H1erald v. Scott, 2 Id. 55; Sering
v. Findlay, 7 Id. 247; Dugdale v. Marine, 11 Id. 194; Roberts
v. lltasters, 40 Id. 461 ; Hayne v. Fisher, 68 Id. 158; James v.
Nicholson, 6 Blackf. 288 ; H1anna v. Pegg, 1 Blackf. 181; Zekind
v. .Newkirk, 12 Ind. 544 ; Bernitz v. Stratford, 22 Id. 320 ; Mar-
kel v. Evans, 47 Id. 326 ; Brown v. Ross, 6 Munf. 391 ; Saunders
Marshall, 4 H. & M. 455 ; Sanford v. Allen, 1 Cush. 473 ; Crouch
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v. R1all, 15 Ill. 263; Sherman v. Smith, 20 Ill. 350 ; Thompson v.
Armstrong, Beecher's Breese 23 ; Luck v. Cook, Id. 53 ; Holbrook
v. Camp, 38 Conn. 23; Clark v. Merriam, 25 Conn.582; Ranson
v. Sherwood, 26 Id. 437.
In none of these cases has it been decided that the holder may
credit on the note the amount of property liable to be applied to the
payment of the note, and then sue the assignor or guarantor for
the remainder. Such a rule would be a reasonable one, and of no
more uncertainty than the question of utter insolvency, when pro-
perty of the maker is mortgaged to its full value, and it is necessary
to make proof of that fact to establish the futility of taking and
selling it on execution. But the courts have been cautious and
very conservative in extending the rule of insolvency as an excuse
for not suing. In speaking of the rules requiring suit and return
of nulla bona, or proof of utter insolvency, one court has said :
" We know of no decision which has carried the privilege of the
assignee beyond this :" James v. Nicholson, 6 Blackf. 288. If,
however, only sufficient property could be seized to pay the costs
of the action, that would be an utter insolvency in the maker; for
the action would result in no benefit either to the maker, or the as-
signor, or guarantor. These are such costs, however, as are given by
statute, and not those contracted for, as in the case of attorneys' fees
in the latter instance.
Connecticut Rule.-The rule referred to in the preceding sec-
tion is not the law of Connecticut. The law governing the assign-
ment in that state is that the maker will be able at the time the note
falls due, or when the proper process can be brought against him, to
pay the whole obligation assigned, the same as in any other states ;
but it is also a part of the contract of assignment, that if he shall not
be able to pay the whole debt when due, the contract is broken and
an immediate right of action exists in favor of the assignee against
the assignor. "The endorser contracted that the whole bill, not a
part of it, should be collectible. If only a part could be collected, the
contract was broken." This was said in answer to the claim set up
that even though the property of the debtor be insufficient, suit
must be brought against him: Gillespie v. Wheeler, 46 Conn. 410;
W4elton v. Scott, 4 Id. 527; Clark v. Merriam, 25 Id. 576 ; Hol-
brook v. Camp, 38 Id. 23; Rhodes v. Seymour, 36 Id. 1 ; Great-
head v. Walton, 40 Id. 226; Clayton v. Coburn, 42 Id. 345;
Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 Id. 175 ; Bradly v. Phelps, 2 Root 325 ;
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Williams v. Granger, 4 Day 444; Allen v. Bundle, 50 Conn. 9;
Sheldon v. Ackley, 4 Day 458; Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213;
Laflin v. Pomeroy, Id. 440; Bnntington v. Harvey, 4 Id. 124.
The law of this state is said to be anomalous: .ABtra Nat. Bank v.
Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 50 Conn. 169. This rule has much in
its favor; and is only a logical result of those cases excusing suit
against the maker, because of his utter insolvency. In requiring
the assignee to bring suit against the maker, if any part of the ob-
ligation can be made, it is virtually making him the agent of the
assignor, for the collection of the amount received from the maker,
which in law, he is not: Welton v. Scott, 4 Conn. 527.
When insolvency must occur.-WMany expressions are used to
the effect that the insolvency to excuse suit against the maker must
occur when the obligation falls due ; but such is not the rule, and
-no court has so held. For a maker may be perfectly solvent at the
time the action against him accrues, and insolvent before process
of collection can be secured. The true rule is that if the insolvency
occurs before the time judgment could be first recovered against the
maker, and process of collection be levied or become a lien upon
his property, or the judgment become a lien thereon, it is sufficient
to bind the assignor or guarantor. The maker's insolvency at the
maturity of the note does not fix the rights of the parties, although
it is an important fact to be considered in determining the liability
of the assignor or guarantor : Reynolds v. Jones, 19 Ind. 123 ; criti-
cising .Dugdale v. Marine, 11 Id. 194; Mlarkel v. -Evans, 47 Id.
326; Roberts v. Masters, 40 Id. 461; Nichols v. Porter, 2 W.
Va. 13; Clayes v. White, 83 Ill. 540; KYayser v. Hall, 85 Id.
511; Robinson v. Olcott, 27 Id. 181; Teller v. Berheim, 3
Phila. 299; Hoffman v. Bechtel, 52 Penn. St. 190; Crawford v.
Berry, 6 G. & J. 63. If the obligation is assigned after due, and
the maker is then insolvent, his solvency when it fell due before
the assignment does not release the assignor: .Kestner v. ,Spath, 53
Ind. 288.
Continuous lnsolveny.-If suit against the assignor or guarantor
is delayed, after the obligation of the maker falls due, it must be
alleged and proven that there was a continuous insolvency from the
time judgment and process of collection could have been obtained,
if suit had been brought, up to the time of bringing the action
against such assignor or guarantor; and if the complaint or declara-
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tion does not contain such an averment, it will be fatally defective
on demurrer: Bonnell v. Bolt, 89 Ill. 71; Brackett v. Rich, 23
Minn. 485; Sanford v. Allen, 1 Cush. 473 ; Yoorhies v. Atlee,
29 Iowa 49; Nichols v. Porter, 2 W. Va. 13; Violett v. Patton,
5 Cranch 142; Riddle v. Mandeville, Id. 822 ; s. o. 6 Id. 86 ; 1
Cranch C.C. 95 ; " when he sues the endorser he must show that the
institution of a suit against the maker would have been unavailing,
at any time intermediate between the maturity of the note and the
commencement of proceedings against the endorser. If he is not
bound to show continued insolvency of the maker, he may, with
the same propriety, select one period of the intermediate time as
another, when he may establish that insolvency :" Bledsoe v.
Graves, 4 Scam. 386; HmThreys v. Collins, 1 Id. 53; Coiner
v. flansbarger, 4 Leigh 452. If insolvency intervenes between
time of taking and issuing execution, it must be averred : iamlin
v. Reynolds, 22 Ill. 207. Where a nulla bona is relied upon, it is
not necessary to show an insolvency between its return and the
institution of the action against the endorser: Speals v. Clark, 3
Ind. 296.
Averment of 1nsolvency.-Insolvency is an affirmative question,
and must be averred and proven by the plaintiff: Couch v. First
Nat. Bank, 64 Ind. 92; and a plea of property in the maker is,
therefore good: Foresman v. Marsh, 6 Blackf. 285; Hamlin v.
Reynolds, 22 Ill. 2.07 ; although it is not necessary for the assignor
to allege it, for the assignee has the burden of showing that there is
none. Stating that the maker "was wholly insolvent at the time
the obligation fell due and still is, having no property subject to
execution," is sufficient averment of insolvency: Schmied v. Prank,
86 Ind. 250; Reynolds v. Stratford, 22 Id. 320; Reynolds v.
Jones, 19 Id. 123; Stevens v. Alexander, 82 Id. 407 ; Patterson
v. Carrell, 60 Id. 128; Bolton v. Xc61ormiek, 45 Id. 411;
"wholly and notoriously insolvent," seems to be a sufficient aver-
ment of insolvency: Smythe v. Scott, 106 Id. 249; Gwin v.
Moore, 79 Id. 103. See Shepard v. Phears, 35 Tex. 764; Hum-
phreys v. Collier, 1 Scam. 47; Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263 ;
Sherman v. Smith, 20 Id. 350. To aver merely that suit would
have been "unavailing" is not sufficient: Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill.
263. Of course the allegation in Connecticut should be that the
maker did not have sufficient property out of which the assignee
could have collected his claim.
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-Evemption.-In considering the question of insolvency of the
maker, his right of exemption must be taken into consideration.
Even though he have enough property out of which he could pay
the claim, yet, if it is exempt, he is, to all intents and purposes,
insolvent. And this too where the exemption could only be claimed
by the debtor after execution issued and levy made, by filing with
the officer a sworn schedule of the property desired to be freed from
the execution; Williams v. Osborn, 75 Ind. 281 ; Bozell '. Hau.
ser, 9 Id. 522; Campbell v. Gould, 17 Id. 133 ; Dick v. Hitt, 82
Id. 92; Simpkins v. Smith, 94 Id. 470 ; Pierce v. Short, 14 Ill.
144.
Proof of lnsolveny.-Proof of insolvency by reputation cannot
be made: Herald v. Scott, 2 Ind. 55 ; Sering v. .Findlay, 7 Id.
247; Reed v. Thayer, 9 Id. 157; l0Iarkel v. -Evans, 47 Id. 326;
2lfelinney v. MHc onnel, 1 Bibb 239; Trimble v. Webb, 1 T. B. Mon.
101. It must be proven as a fact by showing that there was no
property subject to execution. The jury draws the conclusion as
to solvency or insolvency: Schmied v. Frank, 86 Ind. 250. The
fact that the maker was reputed to be insolvent, is no excuse for
not suing him: Roberts v. lMasters, 40 Ind. 461. Under a general
allegation of insolvency, an adjudication in bankruptcy against the
maker of the note is admissible: Wills v. Claflin, 92 U. S. 135.
In Virginia general reputation of insolvency is admissible, from
which the jury may draw the conclusion of absolute insolvency:
Saunders v. Marshall, 4 H. & M. 455 ; Barksdale v. Fenwick, 2
H. & M. 113 n.; Lee v. Love, 1 Call 497, and a like rule prevails
in Maryland: Lewis v. Roblitzell, 6 G. & J. 259; Crawford v.
Berry, 6 Id. 63; Griffith v. Parks, 32 Md. 1. If it appears that
the debtor had property not exempt shortly after the obligation fell
due, the presumption is that it would have been made : Roberts v.
Haskell, 20 Ill. 59. If insolvency is shown at the date the note
fell due, continued insolvency may be presumed until suit brought:
Markel v. Evans, 47 Ind. p. 332.
Joint Action against Maker and Assignor or Guarantor.-
Where it is permissible to show the insolvency of the maker, with-
out bringing suit against him, the assignor or guarantor and maker
may be sued in one action, and a joint judgment taken against
them, in some forums: Mixv. StateBank, 13 Ind. 521; Couch v.
First Nat. Bank, 64 Id. 92; Robertson v. Cauble, 57 Id. 420.
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